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Abstract: This article aims to analyze radicalism movement 
in Indonesia from Islamic-Populism perspective. In various 
academic studies about Islam, radicalism is perceived as an 
act of violence and terrorism. However, the study of 
radicalism was not always generating both premises. 
Populism sees many aggressive measure perpetuated by 
Muslims against the authoritarian regime is also a source of 
radicalism. Likewise, the absence of Muslim representation 
in formal politics has resulted in violence. In Islamic 
countries, global caliphate and/or implementation of 
sharia, which have been claimed as the purpose of radical 
Muslims, actually is the strategy to free themselves from the 
authoritarian forces. This article will examine deeper onto 
the dynamics of power of populism within radical groups 
in Indonesia. This article argues that radical Islamism is 
deeply connected to local and global histories of Islamist 
movements. Through the perspective of Islamic-populism, 
it is found out that radicalism emerged from the spirit of 
liberation to free Muslims from economic inequality and 
political marginalization. 
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Introduction 
The term Islamic-Radicalism in Indonesia is debatable. This is 
because there is no consensus between Islamic scholars in defining this 
term. In many Islamic studies, there are two mainstream perspectives 
developed in analyzing radicalism. The first mainstream is a security 
oriented approach and then a structural-oriented approach. The 
security approach mainstream analyses radicalism primarily concerned 
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with issues of terrorism and violence1. Both issues inherited in majority 
research among Islamic scholars such as Saiful Mujani, Ahmad Syafi’i 
Maarif, and Azyumardi Azra. In his book titled Muslim Demokrat, 
Mujani argued that there is an interconnectivity between external 
influence from Middle East who has brought Pan-Islamism, Muslim 
Brotherhood, and global caliphate and Muslims in Indonesia2. Those 
ideas are established in contemporary Islamic organization like Jamaah 
Islamiyah, Jamaah Ansarut Tauhid, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, and 
many others. Meanwhile, Azra and Ma’arif agree with Mujani’s thesis 
in concluding that Islamic trans-national movement has great influence 
to idea for organizing Islamic movement in Indonesia. Furthermore, 
Maarif even mentioned that Wahhabism plays a significant role and in 
fact becomes a role model in creating and converting Muslims in 
Indonesia into terrorists3.  
On the other hand, the structuralist-oriented approach analyzes 
radicalism in Indonesia by arguing that it is rooted from poverty 
problem in society. This is because inequality and marginalization in 
economic and social aspects has grown wider within society. In this 
mainstream, it is clear that the rich people become richer and the poor 
people become poorer and this condition has made easier for poor 
people to be radicalized. Thus, Islamic militancy is a response to 
poverty or impoverishment. Indonesia is not alone in this case. Many 
other countries also are hotbeds of militant Islam. The point is that 
militant Islam tends to surge in countries experiencing disillusionment, 
poverty and despair. Therefore, to reduce militancy is simply by 
improving economic condition and addressing economic inequality. 
The roots of Islamic radicalism must be looked for outside the 
religion, in the real world of cultural despair, economic decline, 
political oppression, and spiritual turmoil in which most Muslims find 
themselves today. In the case of the Middle East, many Islamic 
organizations also stress radicalism as a response towards political 
oppression and economic inequality. Hassan Al-Banna, the founder of 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt emphasized characteristic of political 
                                                                 
1 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002), p. 65. 
2 Saiful Mujani, Muslim Demokrat, Islam, Budaya Demokrasi, dan Partisipasi Politik di 
Indonesia Pasca-orde Baru (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2007), p. 45. 
3 Abdurrahman Wahid, Ilusi Negara Islam (Jakarta: Maarif and Wahid Institute, 2011), p. 
74. 
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movement in Muslim Brotherhood as anti-political oppression 
perpetuated by the regime that, in their opinion, collaborating with 
western bourgeoisie.4 The term "radical" needs careful definition 
because this term is very sensitive and multi-interpretative. The term 
"radical" is often associated with disagreement or terrorism that 
cornered Islam as universal religion. In this, paper, I explore Islamic-
radicalism using three analysis model. First, they believe that the 
Qur’an and Sunnah must be implemented literally by Muslims and this 
means purity from any interpretation of Islamic scholars and priests 
who traditionally hold authority in interpreting the Qur’an and Sunnah. 
Second, their point of views about Islamic teaching is very 
conservative particularly when it is used as the basis for rebuilding 
society and the state. Three, they give legitimation for their violent 
action in achieving their goals; building Islamic state and global 
caliphate.  
This paper intends to examine the characteristics of Islamic-
Radicalism in Indonesia by using populism paradigm. It particularly 
focuses on the trajectory of political Islam in Indonesia from the 
political oppression and stereotyping perpetuated by New Order 
regime on Muslims to the rise of political Islam in the so called Era 
Reformasi. It argues that there are two problems faced by Muslims in 
Indonesia that fuel Islamic radicalism, namely the political oppressions 
by ruling regime and re-colonialization by the United States with the 
banner of “war against terrorism”.  
Islamic-Populism as Response of Authoritarian Regime: 
Conceptual Framework 
Populism is understood here as a response to issues related to 
oppression of power and inequality of economic by authoritarian 
regime5. The notion of populism itself has a relatively long history and 
began to be used to describe leadership in Latin America that has 
problems with inequality issues due to its overly expansive 
macroeconomic policies. The term populism then is used in Asia after 
1997 where there was a raise of people’s resistance towards the 
authoritarian governments and is caused by the economic crises. In 
                                                                 
4 Michael Fischer, “Islam and the Revolt of Petit Bourgeoisie,” Daedalus, Volume 111, 
Issue 1 (1982), p. 105. 
5 Margaret Canovan, Populism (New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1981), p. 5. 
  
Radicalism in the Perspective of Islamic-populism  
271 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 07, Number 02, December 2013 
other words, populism is a political philosophy which supports the 
rights of people in their struggle against the privileged elites. In this 
paper, I use a simple definition of populism. Here, populism is defined 
as the resurgence of people power to achieve the goal that is 
establishing a democratic state replacing the authoritarian government 
such as New Order regime.  
In general, democracy is understood and accepted as an antithesis 
to authoritarianism and it is considered as alternative form of state. 
However, in Indonesian political context, I see that democracy has not 
yet generally been accepted as some Islamist groups who insist the 
concept of an Islamic state as an ideal state in Indonesia. When we 
discuss Islamic populism then it is defined as a response to the 
oppression on Muslims perpetuated by the authoritarian regime that 
causes hatred to the state6. Historically, Islamic-populism can be traced 
from the state or government suppression of some Muslim elites right 
after the independence.7 Actually, the history of political root of 
Islamic populism can be traced back in the Middle East particularly 
Egypt and Turkey. Similar to Indonesia, the social base of organized 
Islam in both countries was influenced by the rise of Leftist tendencies 
in society. However, this interrelation between Islam and Leftist 
tendencies requires a more comprehensive interpretation and further 
clarification. First, Islamic populism has to be distinguished from the 
populism of rulers and states (Peronist populism, Kemalist populism, 
etc.). Second, Islamic populism is not another variant of clientelist 
‘populism’ which is based on patronage politics.  
 The emergence of Leftist in the Middle East is related to the 
state’s neo-liberal economic policies that created conducive economic 
conditions and an emerging transnational financial networks wherein 
Muslim bourgeoisie evolved out from the arena. Populism in Islamism 
concept is defined as “ideology of liberation” that consistently fight for 
redistribution of resources from dominant groups to subordinate 
groups. So, the emergence of Islamic populism is caused by the fact 
that Muslim bourgeoisie were marginalized and disadvantaged by the 
rapid development of the new layer of capitalists due to the neo-liberal 
policies. That condition also resulted in a mass migration from rural 
                                                                 
6 Vedi R. Hadiz, “Indonesian Political Islam: Capitalist Development and the Legacies 
of the Cold War,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Volume 30, Issue 1 (2011), p. 
10.  
7 Ibid. 
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areas to the urban areas looking for better jobs and access to social 
services. This condition leads to riots among Muslims especially the 
middle class and the puritans struggling for economic justice for all.  
In the case of Turkey, most religious movements are actually 
responses to modern problems such as capitalist exploitation and 
totalitarian authoritarianism. As such, religious movements turn out to 
tend more on actively creating modernism and their own critic rather 
than preserving the tradition. Turkey underwent two dominant 
challenges; Islam and the relation to democracy as well as Islam that is 
perceived as incompatible to capitalism. In the case of Turkey, one 
sees the evolution of an understanding of Islam that is both 
entrepreneurial and capitalist-oriented. The rise of a Muslim 
bourgeoisie is a challenge to the relationship between Islam and 
capitalism as one of incompatibility and antagonism. When Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk came to power in 1923, he launched “a New Turkey” 
as a modernization project by adopting western values to substitute 
Islamic values that are attributed by him as barbarian and not 
supportive for the development of Turkey. Following that, he 
implemented the policy well known as “the six arrows“(Altı Ok). The 
first principle is republicanism principle (cumhuriyetcilik). Here, Turkey 
accepted parliamentary democracy system led by president or prime 
minister; not by sultan or caliphate. The second principle is nationalism 
principle (milliyetcilik) which means that citizenship is not determined 
by a particular religion or sect. Third principle is statehood principles 
(devletcilik) which means that the state have full authority in managing 
economic life and have rights to do intervention in economic area for 
public interest. The fourth principle is populism principles (halkcılık) 
which is defined as supremacy of human rights protection and equality 
of all people before the law. The fifth principle is secularism (laiklik). 
The last principle is evolutionism principle (inkilapcılık)8. 
In this context, the development of a capitalist modern Turkey 
which is based on secular regime is believed as a threat for Islam. That 
time, Islamists are branded as backward. In addition, the sharia system 
is alleged as the backwardness source for Turkey’s bad name of “The 
Sick man of Europe”. The secular regime also campaigned what they 
call as “enlightened Islam”. The jargon, enlightened Islam, is 
campaigned as Islam that is liberated from traditional Arabic values. In 
                                                                 
8 Cihan Tugal, “Islamism in Turkey: beyond Instrument and Meaning,” Economy and 
Society, Volume 31, Issue 1 (February 2002), p. 90. 
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1998, “enlightened Islam” got resistance and challenges from puritans 
and leftists. They challenged this definition and even accused the 
capitalist and the secular regime as the ones who were backward. 
Furthermore, they also argued that the poverty and marginalization of 
majority of Islamist was also because they were excluded by the state 
and the import-substitution policies. They claimed that the regime was 
always in favor of a secular-oriented and big city-based bourgeois 
group as the carrier of its modernization projects and tended to 
marginalize Islamist in economic area. This condition then led to 
conformity of resistance from those Islamists in Turkey by establishing 
Islamist party as a vehicle for struggling for people who were 
marginalized by capitalism and the non-populist state policy.9 It is said 
that the party is the way to struggle but in a way also is ‘peaceful’ 
adaptation to the way capitalism and modernism works. The Justice 
Democratic Party (JDP), the Islamist party, defines itself as the one 
voicing the marginalized people and what they call as subaltern Islam. 
Since then, justice becomes a main issue of this party to advocate 
economic improvement of the Islamist and alleviate them from 
poverty. 
Justice also becomes main issue that carried the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) in their political activity. This 
movement struggled for economic inequality for Muslims who had 
been marginalized by the military-backed regime. Egypt under Nasser 
had tendencies to applying socialism and Arab nationalism as 
foundation of the state in opposing Muslim Brotherhood’s idea of 
Islamic state. As a result, Muslim Brotherhood suffered from political 
isolation from the regime including imprisonment of their leaders and 
cadres. Meanwhile, during presidency of Anwar Sadat, Egypt was 
deemed too liberal by issuing a policy to liberalize economic sector. In 
addition, after the Camp David peace accord, he was accused of being 
pro-Jewish and later established diplomatic ties with Israel who had 
been become old enemy for Muslim Brotherhood. That condition was 
triggering economic disparity between Muslims and Coptic Christians 
wherein the Copt got preferential treatment from the government. The 
rise of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is often said as a more political 
activity. It is fundamentalist movement as it intends to establish 
                                                                 
9 Olaf Schumann, “Jihad for Whom? The Radicalization of Religion as a Response to 
Political Oppression: From Turkish to Indonesian Islam,” Journal of Indonesian Islam, 
Volume 2, Issue 2 (December 2008), p. 248. 
  
Wasisto Raharjo Jati 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 07, Number 02, December 2013 
274 
Islamic state in Egypt. Still, beyond that reason, the rise of Muslim 
Brotherhood is mainly due to economic equality movement based 
economic justice of Muslims10. 
Meanwhile, in Indonesian context, the New Order period has 
played an important part in the emergence of Islamic populism. This is 
due to the fact that Islam came as a representation of populism 
movement against the authoritarian regime that is based on capitalist 
modernization. Basically, there is a number of factors that plays role 
and influences in the emergence of Islamic populism. The first is the 
fluctuation in relationship between state and Muslims in Indonesia 
during the New Order era. The second is role played by political Islam 
as a major articulator in social justice issues in relation to the social 
contradictions associated with rapid capitalist development in the late 
twentieth century. The third is the long phase of authoritarian capitalist 
development under New Order regime that is considered as the fertile 
ground of the so called ‘Islamic radicalism’ in Indonesia.11 The revival 
of middle-class oriented political Islam is the one major development 
in a state-society relation in the late New Order period. In addition, the 
resurgence of populist Islam based political power in Indonesia’s post-
New Order era is characterized by the young Muslim generation began 
to significantly speak about the need for a greater role for Islam in 
domestic politics and foreign policy making.12 In addition to that, the 
rise of Islam populism is also indicated by the emergence of 
proliferation of the paramilitary wings associated with Islamist 
organizations. These include Laskar Pembela Islam (LPI - Defenders of 
Islam Militia); Laskar Jihad (LJ - Jihad Militia); Laskar Mujahidin 
Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahidin Militia) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI - 
Islamic Community). Many of these groups have roots in the Islamic 
militias of Indonesia’s independence struggle. Yet, their current 
activities owe more to the tutelage of hadrami (Indonesians of Yemeni 
                                                                 
10 Malika Zeghal, “Religion and Politics in Egypt: The Ulama of Al-Azhar, Radical 
Islam, and The State,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Volume 31, Issue 3 
(August 1999), p. 380. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Bob Hadiwinata, Democracy in Indonesia: The Challenge of Consolidation (New York: 
Nomos Publishers, 2007), p. 380. 
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descent) who fought alongside the mujahidin in Afghanistan in the late 
1980s.13  
The Genesis of Indonesian Political Islam and Islamic-
Radicalism in Indonesia  
According to Van Bruinessen, Islamic radicalism in Indonesia can 
be traced back from the emerging struggle for independence. Here, 
Islam developed three major political responses to and within the 
emerging national project.14 These were the traditionalist Sunni Islamic 
organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU – the Awakening of Ulama), the 
modernist Islamic political party, Masjumi (Council of Muslim 
Organizations) and the militant Islamist movements, Darul Islam (DI - 
Home of Islam) and Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII - Indonesian Islamic 
Army). After Indonesia became independent from the Dutch colonial 
rule in 1945, the strained conflict began between Islamist and more 
secular forces concerned the question of whether Indonesia should 
become an Islamic state. The Islamists favored the implementation of 
sharia and state that in the constitution and making Indonesia become 
an Islamic state. Unsurprisingly, the proposal for Islamic state is 
rejected by secular force fearing the consequence that if Indonesia 
becomes an Islamic state, Christian majority in Eastern Indonesia 
would not want to integrate or unite in one nation. The Idea of 
“religious states” then becomes “middle way” to bridge aspirations 
from both the secular group and the Islamist group. Nevertheless, it 
turns out that not all Islamists accepted the “middle way” that is the 
religious state becomes the foundation in the constitution. The 
minority of Islamists even started rebellion with the goal to establish 
an Islamic state (Negara Islam) through military force. The so-called 
Darul Islam movement eventually managed to proclaim the 
establishment of Islamic rule in parts of West Sumatra, West Java, and 
South Sulawesi but these were eventually diminished by the central 
government after a decade- long civil war.15  
                                                                 
13 Giora Eliraz, Islam in Indonesia: Modernism, Radicalism, and the Middle East Dimension, 
(Sussex: Sussex Publishers, 2004). 
14 Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto 
Indonesia,” South East Asia Research, Volume 10, Issue 2 (2002), p. 125. 
15 Greg Barton, “The Historical Development of Jihadi Islamist Thought in 
Indonesia,” in Scott Helfstein, Radical Islamic Ideology in South East Asia (New York: 
South East Asia Project, 2011), p. 38. 
  
Wasisto Raharjo Jati 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 07, Number 02, December 2013 
276 
When Soeharto came to power after a bloody massacre in 1965, he 
saw Islamism become one of potential sources of radicalism and 
opposition to his government. This is a significant potential threat 
especially considering that the New Order really emphasized the 
stability of power as the foundation for its continuance. As an 
anticipation, the New Order regime produced several policies to 
eliminate the possibility of political instability; policies that were 
categorized by many Islamists as anti-Islam. The political Islam is 
being stigmatized to the extent where people perceived Islam as 
“political enemy number two” after communism. The Regime wishes 
to position Islamists as periphery actors in Indonesia’s political life. 
Islamists are being marginalized by restricting the use of Islamic 
symbols and terms as well as limiting the number of Islamic parties.16  
In 1973, New Order began to do what some call as de-politization 
of Islam by enforcing all Islamic political power to merge in one party; 
The PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan - United Development Party). 
This party is supposed to serve function as “representation” for 
Islamists in politics. Yet, history shows that PPP experienced many 
difficulties and is mostly caused by the regime’s continuous efforts to 
weaken the party with the “floating mass policy”. This policy restricts 
political parties to establish their representative offices in districts or 
villages.  
The Regime also uses another strategy to keep their eyes on the 
Islamists by establishing CSIS (Centre for Strategic and International Studies) 
in the 1970s, a think-tank institution under direct rule from General 
Ali Moertopo. This comes back to the fact that Islamists are seen as a 
threat as they have tendencies to oppose the regime. In this 
construction, being radical is defined and pictured as negative or 
simply ‘the Bad Islam’ while on the contrary being moderate is 
pictured as positive or ‘the Good Islam’. The New Order also began to 
enforce Pancasila (The Five Principles) as the sole principle to all 
Islamist organizations. Here, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, 
the two largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia accepted Pancasila 
as their sole principle. This position was followed by many other 
Islamic organizations. There is, though, a minority of Islamist like 
Abdullah Sungkar and Abubakar Ba’asyir, allegedly accused as the 
founders of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), insisted to stick to their idea to 
                                                                 
16 Felix Heiduk, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Radical Islam in Post-Suharto 
Indonesia,” International Journal of Conflict and Violence, Volume 6, Issue 1 (2012), p. 31.  
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establish Islamic state in Indonesia.17 Nevertheless, JI had very little 
political influence because the New Order Regime heavily repressed 
the political Islam  
Here, the so called “Komando Jihad” was created by Soeharto’s 
regime to stigmatize “Islamic extremist” and Islamic movement. 
Soeharto regime legitimized their authoritarian politics of the New 
Order through the state-led development strategies. The Regime 
argued that they would not allow any political instability caused by 
many possible groups especially the Islamist movement as it would 
likely jeopardize the economic growth as well as the stability of 
power.18 
In addition to that, Soeharto regime also created what is called as 
“Komando Jihad”. The creation is aimed at showing how the “radical 
Islam” does pose a real threat. This discourse about Komando Jihad is 
fabrication of the regime and it shows how the regime exploits the 
notion to depict Islamists to the extent that they are as dangerous as 
communism as represented by the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai 
Komunis Indonesia). The regimes raise rumors that Komando Jihad are 
derived from pesantren (Islamic Traditional Boarding School) where 
they establish connection and network with mujahedeen in Afghanistan 
or the Middle East. “Komando Jihad” was also depicted in New 
Order’s propaganda as an underground organization with the intention 
of seizing power by violence and establishing Islamic state in 
Indonesia. The famous incident in relation to Komando Jihad is the 
Hijacking of a plane that took place in Thailand’s Dong Muang Airport 
in 1981. This was when Garuda Indonesia was hijacked by unknown 
people who then were said as the radical Islam terrorists. All 
passengers are the hostages and the flight route was forced to reroute 
from Medan to Bangkok. The hijacking was then overcome by 
Indonesian Special Armed Force. All mainstream international media 
appreciated the Indonesian government for successfully saving the 
plane from “terrorists”. At the same time, Soeharto’s regime accused 
the radical Islam for those behind the incident; they even exploited 
                                                                 
17 Greg Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam (Sidney: 
University of New South Wales Press, 2004), p. 30. 
18 Anies Rasyid Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia - Present and Future 
Trajectory,” Asian Survey, Volume 44, Issue 5 (2004), p. 675. 
  
Wasisto Raharjo Jati 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 07, Number 02, December 2013 
278 
that incident as propaganda19. “Komando Jihad”, again, is used as a 
vehicle to depict Islam as having “hard-liners” and that they are 
terrorists. The propaganda then led to a heated tension between the 
state and Islamists and reached the peak in 1984 when many people 
demonstrated the state’s treatment on political Islam with the famous 
Tanjung Priok incident. The incident happened in 12 September 1984 
in Tanjung Priok Jakarta where several people who are accused for 
giving anti-government speech at Rawa Badak Mosque Tanjung Priok 
were arrested. There was also an anti-government demonstration held 
in the Tanjung Priok port area at North Jakarta. The participants were 
protesting against the policy requiring all organizations to adopt 
Pancasila as the sole ideology. They were then encircled by security 
forces that opened fire on the demonstrators. Survivors claimed that 
several hundred people were killed during the incident.  
After the Incident, the government was blamed because several 
hundred people become victim. The regime worried Islamist would 
take revenge after the incident and cause riots. Soeharto was fully 
aware of the high potential of chaotic condition in the future and how 
this would potentially jeopardize the stability of power of his regime. 
Here, some changes start to take place. From the late 1980s to the 
1990s, he changed his policy in order to build a stronger political 
coalition with Islam by introducing an Islamization strategy. This 
strategy includes the accentuation of Islamic symbols in public 
discourse and the accommodation of religious socio-political powers. 
In so doing, the Soeharto’s regime introduced the bill on Islamic Court 
in 1989, Islamic sharia banks in 1994 as well as the presidential decree 
of the Compilation of Islamic Law in 1991 (the product, compilation 
of Islamic law, is a reference in Islamic courts regarding family 
matters).20 To be more convincing to the Islamists, he also performed 
pilgrimage to Mecca. Basically, the regime showed more public 
commitment to Islam than previous years.  
The Regime take some other efforts to calm down the situation by 
establishing ICMI/Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (The Indonesian 
Association of Muslim Intellectuals) in 1990 as well as an Islamic bank 
and insurance agency, Bank Muamalat Indonesia. Bank Muamalat 
                                                                 
19 Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar, “Melacak Akar Radikalisme di Indonesia,” Jurnal 
Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Volume 14, Issue 2 (November 2010), p. 175. 
20 Melissa Crouch, Law and Religion in Indonesia: Conflict and the Courts in West Java 
(London: Routledge, 2011), p. 42. 
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Indonesia campaigned its slogan as the first bank in Indonesia that was 
in accordance with sharia. This Bank was established as the initiative 
for establishment of many other Islamic sharia banks and insurance 
companies. In addition, other affirmative policies from government to 
gain sympathy from the Islamists are the establishment of the Abdi 
Bangsa Foundation, the Center of Information and Development Studies 
(CIDES) which is considered as the think-tank association as well as 
the Islamic daily newspaper Republika and Ummat as the educational 
media.21 
The establishment of ICMI in 1991 was actually an illustration of 
the ‘accommodative’ policy of Soeharto’s regime in managing 
Indonesian Muslim community. This policy was aimed to please 
Muslim community with the  expectation that they, in return, will 
express their sole loyalty toward the existing power holder. Unlike 
Komando Jihad who was depicted as terrorist and Islamist-radical, 
ICMI represents the picture of moderate Muslims who could function 
as a bridge between the regime and Muslim. In Indonesian political 
context, ICMI is a state corporatism model to primarily incorporate 
Muslim intellectuals and members of the new urban Muslim middle 
class.22 Many famous Muslim intellectuals joined this group; Amien 
Rais, Sri Bintang Pamungkas, Eggy Sudjana, Din Syamsudin and Adi 
Sasono. This is a new era wherein Islam finally had marked its time as 
a social and political force. In the euphoria, some may even saw it as a 
possible tool to strike back at those deemed responsible for Muslim 
oppression in the past. Despite its nature as state corporatism, ICMI 
has played a significant role in advocating the rise of pro-democracy 
discourse and even encouraged reformasi. Prominent figures within 
ICMI such as Amien Rais and Din Syamsuddin from Muhammadiyah 
and Sri Bintang Pamungkas militantly campaigned by calling for 
Soeharto’s resignation from Presidency. Along with that, they also 
promoted democracy as the only way out from political and economic 
crisis that struck Asian countries in 1997. This financial crisis was 
followed with many mass protests and rallies in a variety of areas; on 
the roads, campuses, and mainly in the Parliament building. As a 
climax of the chaotic condition, Soeharto resigned from presidency on 
21st of May 1998.  
                                                                 
21 Noorhadi Hasan, “Reformasi, Religious Diversity, and Islamic Radicalism after 
Suharto,” Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities, Volume 1 (2008), p. 45.  
22 Ibid.  
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Reorganization of Islamic Political Power in post-New Order 
Era 
The fall of the authoritarian regime in 21 May 1998 has opened the 
door for Islamists to re-enter into Indonesia’s politics. This was 
marked by the establishment of new Islamic political parties and their 
participation in the 1999 General Election. Many of new political 
parties adopted Islam as their ideological orientation and utilized Islam 
as their political linkage between parties, Muslim communities and the 
state as well as Islamic organizations and paramilitaries. This 
phenomenon is called “reorganizing power.” The term of reorganizing 
power here is understood as strengthening the political influence of 
Islam in the political and social space in the society. It was indicated by 
political Islam advocates in Indonesia who have exerted two major 
streams to channel their Islamic aspirations and goals.23 Some of them 
have taken the legal and formal political approach in order to achieve 
their objective by establishing and/or joining in Islamic parties, like the 
Crescent and Moon Party (PBB) and the Justice and Prosperous Party 
(PK). Both parties explicitly declared Islam as their sole ideological 
basis and philosophy while the United Development Party (PPP) also 
rigorously shown its returning to Islam by putting the old symbol, the 
picture of ka’ba.24 
The emergence of Islamic political parties in Indonesia's post-New 
Order encouraged Islamist constituency to revive debate on Piagam 
Jakarta (Jakarta Charter) especially on seven omitted words of ‘dengan 
kewajiban menjalankan syariat bagi pemeluknya’ as adherent obligation for 
Muslims. The emergence of the discourse of revitalization about the 
words was reaction of the New Order Regime’s application of 
Pancasila as the sole ideology in many Islamic organizations. One of 
the consequences is the application of sharia (Islamic law) which was 
endorsed with the enactment of sharia bylaws (peraturan daerah/perda), 
on behalf of regional autonomy. In the context of regional autonomy 
in Indonesia, the enactment of sharia was introduced Aceh by forming 
qanun asasi as provincial bylaws based on Islamic values.25 Qanun Asasi 
                                                                 
23 Vedi R. Hadiz and Richard Robison, Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of 
Oligarchy in an Age of Markets (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 125. 
24 Paul J. Carnegie, “The Politics of Indonesia’s Islamic Identification,” Dialogue, 
Volume 4, Issue 1 (2006), p. 12. 
25 Greg Fealy, “Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival,” Southeast Asian 
Affairs (2004), p. 115.  
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contained moral rules should be obeyed by Acehnese such as 
regulations to compel Muslim women to adhere to Islamic dress codes, 
wearing the headscarf in public space and implementation of canning 
for the convicted fornication and stealing. This implementation of 
sharia in Aceh is followed by many regions especially in number of 
districts in West Java and several districts in South Sulawesi, including 
Maros, Gowa, and Bulukumba. These regions commonly emphasized 
Qur’an literacy for head district who want to compete for election, 
issued regional regulation to prohibit prostitution practice and 
restricting distribution of alcohol.26  
Implementation of sharia as “Islamization” process in Indonesia is 
a sign of rising middle class seeking moral orientation and identity in a 
rapidly changing socio-political and economic environment.27 Sharia 
becomes main issue for the Islamists to put an end to so-called secular 
regime who had been repressive and oppressive. It was indicated by 
the political competition between Islamist and nationalist in the early 
period of Reformasi Era. The competition started since anti- Habibie 
demonstration emerged in November 1999, nationalist group worried. 
In addition to this issue, nationalists also questioned Habibie's 
commitment to eradicate corruption especially when his handling of 
corruption cases relating to Soeharto and his cronies did not fulfill 
people’s expectation. The competition continues when the presidential 
election was held in 2004 wherein Megawati Soekarnoputri, the 
chairman of Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesia 
Democratic Party of Struggle) run for presidential nomination. Many 
Islamist organizations passed a recommendation that the president 
should be male according to Islamic injunctions. If Megawati were 
elected as president, Islamist would not accept her presidential office 
because of her gender and secular ideology. 
Series of failure that Islamist political force experienced to 
establish Islamic state in Indonesia through formal political channels 
and eliminate influence of secular force in Indonesian politics triggered 
some Islamist to intensify extra-parliamentary strategy. Islamic militia 
groups emerged in response to that failure in formal political stage by 
using jihad ideology. Originally, jihad is defined as holy struggle against 
                                                                 
26 Wasisto Jati, “Permasalahan Implementasi Perda Syariah Dalam Otonomi Daerah,” 
Al-Manahij, Volume 7, Issue 2 (2013), p. 8.  
27 Angel M. Rabasa, Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals and Terrorists 
(London: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 78. 
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kafir people who rejects God or who hides, denies, or covers up the 
"truth." Nowadays, after the 9/11 incident, jihad has become one of 
the most controversial and misunderstood aspects of Islam. This term 
refers to Islamist person who believes that an Islamic state governing 
the entire community of Muslims must be created, and that this 
necessity justifies violent means against those who stand on its way. 
They also idealized martyrdom, which also has a meaning in Islamic 
history, as a way to fulfill religious duty. Newly won-over jihadists 
found great appeal in the romantic vision of dying a martyr's death. 
After Afghan-Soviet war, many radical Islamists came to believe that 
jihad never ends. Soviet occupation is one of Islamist’ enemies, and 
American and Israeli’s political influence in Arab also should be 
stopped. Those nations are categorized as “great Satan” for Islam now.  
“Jihad against the West”: New Pattern of Islamic-Populism 
There are a variety of explanations for elucidate “jihad against the 
west” become the most prominent source of Islamic-radicalism in 
Indonesia. First, West and Jews have used their supremacy of global 
power in economic and military power to subordinate, exploit, and 
suppress the Islamic community (umat) in entire world. Radicals built 
conspiracy rhetoric blaming Zionist and Christian international powers 
for any economic inequality among nations in the world and believed 
in a worldwide the United States-led conspiracy and Israel to 
undermine and annihilate Muslim countries. Second, conditions of 
Muslims are morally degraded due to the influence of Western culture 
and far away from Islamic values. The most abrasive issues were New 
Project of New Worlds (NPNW) which perceives a covert conspiracy 
by Jews planning to rule and dominate the world through capitalism, 
communism, democratization, authoritarianism, revolution and 
economic liberalization, and atheism.  
Whether right or not, NPWP is used by radicals as rhetoric 
paradigm against the West and Jews in many Muslim countries. 
According to the radicals, this chaotic situation can only be rectified by 
returning to the "pristine" Islam practiced by the founding generation 
of Muslim leaders with established global caliphate, Islamic state, and 
implementation of sharia as global law order. They believe that global 
caliphate will be the key to resolve Muslims’ suffering inflicted by Jews 
and the West. Therefore, violent jihad is one only legitimate reason, 
obligatory as a holy war to defend Islam and establish global caliphate. 
The term holy war was generated in Europe during the Crusades 
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episode. Nowadays, holy war as jihadist concept means struggle to 
eradicate the West as great Satan and reconstruct Islam back to early 
era wherein Islam was practiced by the prophet Muhammad and their 
Umma in Mecca and Medina. This desire to recap the true essence of 
early Islam is often labeled as "salafism", drawn from the Arabic term 
al-salaf al-salih or "righteous ancestors" who inherited knowledge of 
Islam directly from the Prophet Muhammad. 
In order to address and legitimate these movements, radical groups 
adopted religious teaching from a medieval scholar affiliated to 
Hanbali school of law, Ibn Taymiya (1268-1328). He proposes a more 
active view of jihad to implement sharia and establish caliphate. This is 
a pretext to revive Muslims from backwardness. Ibn Taymiya's 
thoughts have heavily influenced Muslim extremists in the twentieth 
century, including the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and Osama bin 
Laden. They argue that Muslims’ revival is potential to become a super 
power to challenge the hegemony of Zionist-Crusader international 
forces.  
In many aspects, radical Islamism movement in Indonesia is 
strongly rooted in early Islamist and jihadist thinking from Middle-
Eastern connection. It was indicated by the emergence of many dozens 
of Islamist groups that have the closest ties with Islamist organization 
from the Middle East like Muslim Brotherhood, Mujahedeen Council, 
and many more.28 There are three analyses to investigating the 
emergence of contemporary Indonesian radical Islamism. The first is 
historical context of radical Islamism in Indonesia, its past connection 
to colonialism, as well as a more contemporary one to Middle Eastern 
Islamism. The second is resurgence within the larger context of global 
jihad movements; it traces the origins of the ideology of radicalism 
itself that dominates much of the discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict in Arab countries. The Third is implementation of sharia as 
ideology of state which will be problem solver for the current crises 
and disasters afflicting Indonesia.  
The West and Jewish sentiment still becomes main issue for many 
radical Islamism organizations in Indonesia, but not of all 
organizations are persistent with this issue. There are ramifications 
from main issue becoming sub-issue that used as main goals from 
organizations.  
                                                                 
28 Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New 
Order Indonesia (Ithaca: SEAP Publication, 2006), p. 266. 
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Table 1: Islamic Organization in Post-Soeharto Era and Its Political 
Issue29 
Islamic Organization Main Issue of Movement Type of Action 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Islamic State and Global 
Caliphate 
Non-violent action 
likes seminar, 
demonstration, 
socialization, etc.  
Front Pembela Islam
(Islamic Defenders Front) 
Sharia implementation, but 
doesn’t command to 
establish Islamic state 
Violent action likes 
raid attack to night-
club and discotheque, 
anti-apostasy 
movement 
Laskar Jihad 
(Warriors of Jihad) 
Christianization Project and 
West and Jewish conspiracy 
in Indonesia 
Violent action likes 
paramilitary attack in 
conflict regions (Poso, 
Maluku, Solo, etc) 
Majelis Mujahidin 
Indonesia (Indonesian 
Islamic Warriors' Council) 
complete implementation 
of sharia in Indonesia and 
established Islamic state 
and global caliphate 
Violent action 
Jammah Islamiyah 
(Islamic community) 
Islamic State and Global 
Caliphate 
Violent action likes 
suicide bombing in 
western linked 
building and state 
building, 
Hamas Indonesia
  
 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
 struggle for Palestinian 
independence 
Non Violent action 
There are many issues of movement used by Islamist organizations 
in post-Soeharto Indonesia, which range from sharia, Islamic state, 
global caliphate, and many more. However, as previously mentioned 
radicalism is not only rooted from Islam-related issues. If we see 
carefully, the emergence of Islamist organizations is initially preceded 
by economic inequality and political marginalization. These two 
conditions are truly the onset of radical thought. Radical groups usually 
recruit many young people from desperate and poor families. 
                                                                 
29 Merlyna Lim, “Radical Islamism in Indonesia and Its Middle Eastern Connection,” 
Meria Journal, Volume 15, Issue 2 (June 2011), p. 34. 
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Uniquely, radicalism is driven by intellectual activists who actually 
belong to middle class. The transformation of jihadists from poor 
people to educated ones indicated that radicalism teaching had great 
influence on society. The process of radicalization in school happens 
from the earliest level to university level, through the process of 
indoctrination, which usually occurs through religious extracurricular 
activities in school and college. A survey report from Centre of Islamic 
Studies and Peace during October 2010 to January 2011 showed that 
49 percent of students in Greater Jakarta (Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang 
and Bekasi) tend to agree to take violent action to resolve the problem 
of religion and morality.  
Conclusion 
As this article has shown, Indonesia’s contemporary radical 
Islamism is not compatible with security analysis which mainly 
addresses issues of terrorism and violence. Instead, it does represent a 
complex mixture of tradition, middle eastern-linkage, and revivalism. 
Radical Islamism is not just contemporary phenomenon, but it is 
deeply connected to local and global histories of Islamist movements. 
By putting Islamic-populism as main perspective, this article shows 
that radicalism emerged from the spirit of liberation to free from 
economic inequality and political marginalization. As happened in the 
case of Turkey and Egypt, Islamic radicalism emerged as influential 
political forces in post-authoritarian regimes. Radicalism in Indonesia 
also experienced similar features by relying on the strength of populist 
Muslims. Nevertheless, populism movement in Indonesia does not 
develop into a major political force due to strong influence of secular 
and nationalist politics in formal politics. Populist Islamic movement 
was radicalized by the failure in formal politics. Global caliphate, 
Islamic state, and the application of sharia are the goals of radical 
organizations in Indonesia today. However, it seems it will take time 
for Muslims populist forces to achieve their goals because of its use of 
extra parliament strategy, which is proven ineffective so far. [] 
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